THE "SMART BUYER" PROBLEM FACING THE ARMY
Today, the Army possesses a competent "smart buyer" (SB) capability. But, unless corrective measures are taken shortly, the effect of downsizing the federal government workforce may undermine the Army's SB capability in the future.
By SB capability, we mean that the Army has sufficient in-house technical expertise to stand up to its industry counterparts when dealing with technical issues of the conceptual design, research and development (R&D), and procurement of new military systems. Although the Army's SB capability involves the integrated efforts of many disciplines (including those with technological, engineering, legal, procurement, management and funding expertise), this paper focuses only on technical expertise. For the purposes of this paper, technical expertise encompasses technological, scientific, engineering, and mathematical skills. Unless otherwise noted, SB capability will be used as shorthand for only the technical element of an overall SB capability.
Technical support to the SB function is provided mainly by the technical staff at the Army's R&D organizations. Their technical support helps the Army's concept and materiel developers conceive, formulate, and execute materiel programs. In the context of this paper, the term smart buyers (SBs) refers to in-house technical personnel who, by contributing their individual specialized expertise, collectively represent a smart buyer capability.
The Army must maintain a SB capability because technological superiority is a mainstay of its overall defense strategy. In fact, the Army is relying more and more on advanced technology to modernize its force structure. While the Army XXI force will evolve combat through enhanced battlefield awareness via information technology, the Army After Next (AAN) force will go farther and be a revolutionary, technology-driven future force. Planning for AAN is the major driver of future Army science and technology (S&T), and the Army needs knowledgeable government scientists and engineers (S&Es) who are closely attuned to state-of-the-art developments if it is to fully exploit the technology advances that AAN will require.
The government has been keenly aware of the importance of the SB function for many years. The landmark 1991 Federal Advisory Commission 1 argues that the "mission of the defense laboratories is to provide the technical expertise to enable the services to be Smart Buyers and users of new and improved weapon systems and support capabilities." This quote is the first and most important of the fifteen principal study findings. A recent survey of acquisition workers within the Army and opinions collected from industry representatives both support the position that a capable SB function is vital and must be maintained.
The SB problem facing the Army in the future stems from a shrinking pool of civilian S&Es. Since the SB function is an inherently governmental function, 2 its capability is dictated by the size (and quality) of the government civilian workforce. Currently, there is a trend toward downsizing all government civilians, including S&Es.
Civilian S&Es who help perform the SB function make up a large portion of the Army's civilian workforce. In 1991, the total number of S&Es in the Army was 16,600. By the end of 1998, the number had decreased to 14,330. 3 The projections for the future are for even lower levels 4 . 4 For example, the S&Es at AMC are likely candidates for future cuts. The AMC response to the Defense Reform Initiative Directive #20 (DRID #20) has indicated that 73 percent of the S&Es at AMC are listed as "subject to review," meaning that their jobs could be replaced with contracted workers. For consistency across major commands, the AMC position was changed by the Department of the Army to 15 percent, however, the Office of the Secretary of Defense may change this percentage again to achieve leveling across the services.
-3 -dictated by decisions made outside the Army's jurisdiction. These personnel cuts run counter to maintaining an adequate SB capability because workforce reductions result in personnel turbulence, leading to a possible loss of technical expertise or critical mass in technology areas, poor staff morale, and fragmented work. Unfortunately, the Army has to assume these cuts will continue in the future.
This White Paper draws on current and ongoing RAND research to identify what is needed to counteract the effect of personnel downsizing through changes/efficiencies in the SB capability and workforce; it then makes some recommendations to improve the current situation.
WHAT IS NEEDED TO MAINTAIN AND STRENGTHEN SB CAPABILITY?
Before we can recommend specific corrective actions, we need to discuss what is needed to maintain and strengthen the Army's SB capability. Based on our SB research over the last several years, we have found that three ingredients are required to provide a good SB capability:
• A collaborative research environment;
• Communications with users;
• A cadre of talented and trained technical staff.
In this section, we will summarize our research findings on each of these ingredients and discuss their implications for the SB problem. Our research has shown that industry is willing to partner with the government if a collaborative atmosphere is maintained. A major obstacle to collaboration with industry seems to be the Army's reluctance to embrace these new acquisition reform initiatives.
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT
Cultural barriers in the Army need to be removed that inhibit exploiting these collaboration opportunities. Education and training must be provided to all laboratory personnel--S&Es, legal counsel, contracting, and management. The Army must educate its workforce about the benefits of the acquisition reform initiatives much in the way it has handled military specifications and integrated product teams (IPTs). In particular, it must discuss the various initiatives currently available and show how they can be used to form collaborative research efforts.
COMMUNICATIONS WITH USERS
The Army's concept and materiel developers must have access to the SBs. It does not do any good for the Army to have the brightest and most knowledgeable SBs in the government if their talents are not used by the combat and materiel developers. To be effectively used, the SBs must be closely coupled to the Army users with two-way communications in place. 7 The Army laboratories need to provide the SB function to both the concept developers and the materiel developers. While generally effective today, in some cases the SB communication channels pass across different command structures (e.g., going up one command ladder, across to another, and down to the SBs). In these cases, more direct communication channels are desirable. However, this does not necessarily imply that physical proximity is needed. Although proximity is usually desirable, what is more important is directness of the reporting channels.
The usefulness of the SB information is not determined solely by whether direct communications channels exist or not. Equally important is how effectively they are being used. Effectiveness is dictated by many factors, including the organizational relationships between the SBs and the users, the goals and objectives of the laboratory management, and the users' specific needs.
Our research has addressed organizational reorganizations that enhance communication channels and effective information exchange. In some cases, new organizational reporting chains are needed, while in other cases, streamlined communication channels appear sufficient. 
CADRE OF TALENTED TECHNICAL STAFF
The third ingredient to providing a good SB capability involves people. The Army must have a talented technical staff of S&Es available to maintain a competent SB capability. This means the Army needs to acquire, sustain, and train/develop technically competent S&Es and also be able to separate less-productive staff. In the past, the Civil Service system has been a hindrance to achieving some of these goals.
Maintaining a SB capability in a period of downsizing poses an even greater challenge.
Because the civilian S&E personnel issues facing the Army are multifaceted, we will first discuss some of the underlying problems and then describe the analyses we have performed to help better understand them. Since these findings have not yet been published, we will devote more attention to them than we did in previous sections referencing RAND publications. 8 The civilian personnel issues facing the Army are numerous, as illustrated by the staffing statistics of S&Es at two Army laboratories.
As shown in Figure 1 , at ARL, the population of S&Es is bimodal in age We assessed the effectiveness of these initiatives, grouping them into four generic force-shaping areas: acquire, sustain, train/develop, and separate. We then evaluated the initiatives by assessing how well they addressed specific concerns. For example, in the sustain area, we considered whether the various initiatives would: (1) Based on our analysis, we have found effective personnel reform initiatives in all four force-shaping areas. Some of the more important initiatives in each area relevant to civilian S&Es are shown in Table 1 . One survey question asked the respondents, "Please rank the factors contributing to the quality in your smart-buyer personnel: (1) education, (2) recent experience as a performer of research, (3) general engineering experience, and (4) These results suggest that to train civilian S&Es to be good SBs, the Army laboratories must provide opportunities for staff members to engage in each activity. In some cases, changes in the way research is performed at a laboratory will help satisfy the SB training needs. For example, by performing more collaborative research (as discussed above), Army S&Es will be able to gain industrial experience through assignments with industrial teams, off-site exchange programs with industry, and exposure to industrial operations/research practices.
Army S&Es must also be given an opportunity to perform hands-on research experience. This affects the way research should be performed.
While there is increased pressure today to outsource more and more government activities, including more of the Army's S&T, if carried too far, this practice could hurt the Army's SB capability. Already, the AMC outsources about two-thirds of its S&T budget. If outsourcing of S&T continues and is overdone or done unwisely, SB capability will likely degrade. For example, instead of keeping up with state-of-theart technology developments, the government S&Es would be relegated to the role of monitoring the contractor's work without retaining the technical capability to do so and performing other non-research-related administrative/oversight functions.
The importance of education means that efforts are needed to seek top-notch technical talent from ranking colleges and universities using all the available recruiting tools. Intern and co-op programs (as shown in Table 1 ) also provide a mechanism for obtaining qualified recruits from local or regional colleges.
With regard to general engineering experience, Army S&Es should be given the opportunity and the encouragement to obtain advanced degrees and take sabbaticals with other service/government agency laboratories, universities, and industry. Also, they should be given career-enhancing work assignments to expand their engineering experiences.
Another issue addressed in our survey was the recognition of outstanding SB performance. Based on the survey results, we believe the Army laboratories may inadvertently be sending conflicting messages about how they value SBs. While SB activities are recognized as important because they promote good relations with the customers and keep the laboratory recognized as relevant, it is not apparent that the SB efforts of the Army's S&Es are always adequately acknowledged. A cursory examination of achievement awards given out suggests that these awards are given for performing publishable experimental/theoretical research. For example, of the 27 Army R&D Achievement Awards for 1996, none were given for performing an outstanding job as an SB. Similarly, an assessment of the CECOM command awards for the same year show that none of the 13 awards were given for exceptional SB performance. The Army must establish a strategic approach to help mitigate the effects on its SB capability of government downsizing, recruiting impediments, and rivalry for S&Es. Based on our analysis and ongoing research in this area, we recommend that the Army's approach include the following elements.
ESTABLISH WORK ENVIRONMENTS THAT CONTAIN SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF COLLABORATIVE EFFORTS
Army R&D organizations should be encouraged to perform more collaborative research with other services, government agencies, and private industry. This will entail implementing new ways of doing business using acquisition reform initiatives that permit leveraging the other services and government agencies and partnering with industry. Finally, the Army must be willing to be flexible in negotiating with the industrial partners (e.g., minimizing burdensome oversight and regulations). The Army can ensure this requirement is met through a well-planned series of work assignments.
ENSURE THAT THE WORK ENVIRONMENT ENCOURAGES DIRECT AND OPEN
Third, the Army must create influences that will encourage talented and promising SBs to stay. The Army must ensure that career advancement opportunities are available to its S&Es. Reform initiatives such as pay broadbanding will help, but more innovations may be needed. In addition, the Army must ensure that tangible recognition of good smart buying reflects the importance the Army places on this capability. For example, criteria for salary increases, promotions, and awards may have to be defined, established, or revised to better tie outstanding performance of smart buying to these rewards.
If these actions are implemented, then the Army's SB capability will not only be maintained, but strengthened.
